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Foreword
Giving local people more power and control over their lives and ensuring delivery of high
quality services are at the heart of this Government’s agenda. 
The joint ODPM/HM Treasury discussion document “Securing better outcomes: developing a
new performance framework” set out the Government’s vision for the delivery of
continuously improving outcomes for all people and all places. The creation of a national
picture of improving local outcomes and of local people getting the services they want, need
and expect is of paramount importance. That is why the Government is developing a
performance framework that builds on national and local needs and expectations – a
framework which places the views of service users, local people and a variety of external
validation at the heart of its agenda. 
While significant improvements have been made in local authorities’ performance in recent
years, there is still considerable variation in performance and it is clear that there is room for
raising performance further as well as for modifying the way in which services are delivered to
reflect local needs and the expectations of service users. The performance framework –
including inspection – needs to reflect these aspirations.
In the Budget, we announced our intention to reform inspection to make it more risk-based,
proportionate and effective. We want to give councils further freedoms to deliver better local
services that reflect the priorities for their areas and communities, and that build on initiatives
such as Local Area Agreements. 
We believe that these proposals will not only rationalise inspection, but will reduce
unnecessary bureaucracy and duplication of effort for all. It will provide clearer lines of
accountability and deliver more consistent approaches.
In this document we set out our aims and aspirations for ensuring that local services are
tailored to local circumstances. This document invites discussion on the future role that
inspection should play within a more flexible performance framework and seeks views on the
establishment of a local services inspectorate. 
Phil Woolas
Minister for Local Government
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Glossary of Terms
4Ps Public, Private Partnerships Programme
AC Audit Commission
ALMO Arms Length Management Organisation
Area Whole or part of a locality, near or surrounding one or more local
authorities
BFI Benefit Fraud Inspectorate
CDRPs Crime and Disorder Partnerships
CPA Comprehensive Performance Assessment
DWP Department for Works and Pensions
IJCSC Inspectorates for Justice, Community Safety and Custody
LACORS Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services
LGA Local Government Association
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Outcomes In the context of this document the term ‘outcomes’ refers to attainable or
delivered results
Peer Review Assessment by serving local government members and officers, with 
first-hand understanding of the issues and challenges that councils face
VFM Value for money
YOTs Youth Offending Teams
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SECTION 1
The Future Role for Inspection 
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 In March 2005, we published jointly with HM Treasury a discussion document Securing
better outcomes – developing a new performance framework, as part of the
local:vision debate. That document set out our proposals to develop a new
performance framework to support and drive further improvement in local services,
through deregulation, devolution and decentralisation. The discussion document
identified a clear role for external challenge in a new performance framework – which
includes appropriately targeted inspection and audit. 
1.2 This document included proposals, as published in the Budget, for the rationalisation of
public service inspectorates from eleven to four covering:
● local services
● children and learners
● health and adult social care
● justice and community safety
The local services inspectorate will combine the functions of the Audit Commission
(AC) and the local authority inspection work of the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) in
England. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) has the lead for establishing
the local services inspectorate.
1.3 This consultation paper builds on the Securing better outcomes document by:
● in Chapter 2, setting out the background and rationale for the proposed changes,
covering both the public service inspection reform agenda and the new performance
framework;
● in Chapter 3, starting to explore in more detail the role inspection should play in the
future performance framework – as a means of generating debate; 
● in Chapters 4–6, setting out proposals for establishing the local services inspectorate
– covering the roles of the inspectorate, governance and funding arrangements, and
issues around the merger of the Audit Commission and Benefit Fraud Inspectorate
functions; and
● in Chapter 7, setting out the timetable for taking this work forward.
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RESPONSES AND ENQUIRIES 
1.4 Responses to the consultation should be sent (if possible by e-mail) by 3 March 2006
to:
Dorothy Dray
LGQ4
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Zone 5/C5
Eland House 
Bressenden Place
London SW1E 5DU
Fax: 020 7944 3799
E-mail: LocalServicesInspection@odpm.gsi.gov.uk 
1.5 Any enquiries or requests for copies of the paper should be directed to Dorothy Dray at
the above address.
1.6 Further details about how this consultation exercise will be carried out are at Annex B.
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Chapter 2 
The Inspection Reform Agenda 
This chapter sets out the background and rationale to the public service inspection
reform agenda, and explores briefly the direction of recent developments in
inspection and the creation of a new performance framework that underpins both
the move to a local service inspectorate and the wider discussion of the role of
inspection. 
2.1 Inspection – independent external review and assessment of performance and value for
money – has an important part to play in the governance of public bodies, providing
external challenge and assurance about the way in which these bodies are performing
their duties and securing outcomes for their users. In July 2003, the Government
published its policy on inspection of public services1, confirming its commitment to
inspection as a tool for contributing to the improvement of delivering public services
and a means of providing assurance on the stewardship of public resources. It set out
ten principles of inspection (see Annex A) and highlighted the need for collaboration
between inspectorates and with other regulators, to maximise the benefit of inspection.
THE IMPACT OF INSPECTION
2.2 Inspection has proved a powerful tool in helping to secure improvements in local
service delivery. The introduction of Comprehensive Performance Assessment is
acknowledged by local authority officers as a key driver of improvements2. A recent
MORI survey on behalf of the Local Government Association3 showed that over 60% of
councils believe that inspection sharpens their focus and three in four, while agreeing
they often dislike inspection, believe it can – when used effectively – drive
improvement.
2.3 However, the success of inspection has also led to a significant increase in the amount
of inspection – and pressures for more. The Devolving Decision-Making Review in 2004
recognised that the balance between centrally-driven or top-down tools to drive
improvement and the freedom of local deliverers to manage their business effectively
was not right. In line with this review and the wider public sector reform agenda, the
Chancellor announced in the Budget in March 2005 a rationalisation, refocusing and
reduction of inspection.
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1 The Government’s Policy on Inspection of Public Services, Cabinet Ofﬁce, July 2003.
2 Meta evaluation of the Local Government Agenda: Progress Report on Service Improvement in Local Government, ODPM,
2005.
3 Inspection – Time well spent?, LGA, 2005.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSPECTION METHODOLOGY
2.4 Over time, inspection methods have become more sophisticated and searching. Best
value inspection started as primarily a validation of best value reviews undertaken by
local authorities, developing into wider assessments of the delivery of individual
services. The introduction of Comprehensive Performance Assessment in 2002 involved
a more radical shift – to delivering a judgement of the overall performance and capacity
of local authorities – combining evidence on individual services with judgements on
corporate capacity and systems. The new Children’s Services Joint Area Reviews bring
together evidence on the performance and contributions of a range of local partners in
securing joined-up outcomes for a particular client group. 
2.5 The development of inspection methods reflects wider developments in local service
delivery. Increasingly, the trend is to inspect the capacity of organisations and their
delivery of services from a user’s point of view. This is also reflected in the growing
recognition in inspection methodologies of the responsibilities of organisations to work
in partnership better, to secure the joined-up outcomes which users expect. Equally, the
focus on the management and delivery of efficiency and value for money has
strengthened. 
2.6 These methodological developments have sought to refine and increase the benefits
delivered by inspection. Alongside them, the recognition of the cost of inspection has
increased. These costs arise both directly to the inspectorates, but also more widely in
the range of costs incurred by inspected bodies in preparing for, undergoing and
responding to inspection. The Government recognises the need to ensure that the
balance of the costs and benefits of inspection is better managed. This has led to the
shift away from rolling programmes of inspection of services, the spreading of
programmes such as the new CPA 2005 corporate assessments over 3 years, the
reductions in inspection that have been delivered for the top performers, and steps by
the Audit Commission and other inspectorates to consider more closely the costs of
recommendations they include in inspection reports. These are all positive steps. The
Government would like to see these trends continue and the future role of inspection
shaped in this light.
2.7 In seeking to find the best balance of costs and benefits of inspection, we need to
recognise wider developments. Recent years have seen the growth of stronger local
performance management, a culture more focused on delivery and wider use of
alternative forms of external challenge and scrutiny. In considering the role of
inspection in future, we need to build on these successes.
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THE PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK AGENDA
2.8 The joint ODPM and Treasury discussion document Securing better outcomes:
developing a new performance framework4, published last March, described a range of
incentives, levers, pressures and responses that together contribute to the total
performance framework that drives improved delivery of local services. It also clearly
identified the different levels at which these levers etc. can operate: top-down,
horizontally (within a sector or between partners), and bottom up (from users and
citizens). The document proposed a new performance framework that seeks a better
balance of both the range of levers and the levels at which they operate – as part of a
move to a more deregulated, decentralised and devolved approach to local services. 
2.9 In particular the Government would like to explore options for strengthening local
performance management and increasing the effectiveness of local pressure on public
bodies, including local authorities, with a view to reducing the number of nationally set
targets and accountabilities commensurately.
2.10 This consultation starts from the perspective that inspection is an important part of the
future performance framework, but does not seek to suggest that it is the only or most
important mechanism. It is just one of the levers and incentives that helps drive
behaviour and performance across the whole system. Sometimes it will be the most
appropriate challenge mechanism – either on its own or combined with other elements
(eg. peer review, information, relationship management). Other times it will not. 
2.11 Chapter 3 focuses on the role of inspection in the wider performance framework. We
wish to generate real debate on this over the coming months to enable us to establish
some clarity about the future role of inspection quickly, in respect of the delivery and
improvement of local services. The role of inspection needs to influence the nature and
functions of the new inspectorates that are to be in place by 2008. Also, a range of
existing inspection programmes – including some of the biggest, like Comprehensive
Performance Assessment and Children’s Services Joint Area Reviews – come to an end
in 2008. Given the time that is required to develop and implement new approaches to
inspection, or even to modify existing ones, we cannot delay in addressing these issues.
2.12 The creation of four new inspectorates provides a means of promoting and securing
greater co-ordination and rationalisation of inspection. The second part of this
consultation focuses on the arrangements we are proposing for the local services
inspectorate, to enable us to establish it by 2008.
Inspection Reform: The Future of Local Services Inspection
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4 Securing better outcomes: developing a new performance framework, ODPM & HM Treasury, March 2005.
Chapter 3
The Future Role of Inspection
This chapter explores the issues that will shape the role of inspection in the context
of the development of a new performance framework. We want to generate debate
over the next few months so that a clear view of the role of inspection can both
influence the setting up of the new local services inspectorate and enable work to
be started in 2006 on methodologies and approaches for delivering this role. 
3.1 Determining the appropriate role of inspection in the new performance framework,
involves consideration of:
● why inspect (ie. clarifying the aims of inspection in the performance framework
driving local service delivery);
● what to inspect (organisations, areas, partnership working);
● when and where to inspect (ie. the basis on which decisions to inspect are taken).
These issues are explored in the rest of this chapter.
3.2 While the basic framework for future inspection needs to be set clearly by Government,
more detailed issues, including the development of methodologies and practices to
implement this framework are a matter for the inspectorates to determine, reflecting:
● policy ambitions for public services and the Government’s 10 Principles of
Inspection set out in Cabinet Office/HMT’s Inspecting for improvement5 in 2003 
(see Annex A);
● their expertise; and
● best practice in the field of inspection.
WHY INSPECT? – CLARIFYING THE AIM OF INSPECTION
3.3 The key characteristics that inspection brings to the benefit of local services are:
● independence The fact that an inspectorate is independent – both of those whom
it is inspecting and of Government – enables it to undertake its work without fear or
favour. It is also key in ensuring the credibility of its judgements with the public and
other parties. 
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5 Inspecting for improvement: developing a customer focused approach, Ofﬁce of Public Services Reform, July 2003.
● analysis of an evidence base While a better and more transparent information
framework will be a critical underpinning of the new performance framework,
indicators and data do not always provide a full picture – both of current
performance or of risks to future delivery. Inspectorates develop expertise in the
analysis and challenging of evidence in order to provide a more comprehensive
overview.
● judgement The analytical expertise of inspectorates is complemented by their
ability, systematically and robustly, to derive judgements of strengths and weaknesses
and propose means of making improvements. The publication of these judgements
is a powerful driver of change and provides an important aid to accountability and
transparency in the system.
3.4 The Government has, over time, identified a number of potential aims for independent
inspection and other forms of external review:
● to provide assurance about the delivery of services or outcomes either:
– where the risk of failure is particularly high; or 
– where the impact of failure is particularly significant; or 
– where the Government has particular interests or ambitions for delivery (ie. areas
of national priority).
● to provide assurance about the delivery of minimum standards or targets, including
consideration of unintentional consequences or impacts;
● to provide assurance about the impact and accessibility of public services for
particular groups, such as those who are at risk of, or experiencing, social exclusion;
● to contribute to ensuring that policies and procedures are in place to protect public
funds from fraud, abuse and error;
● to help drive continuous improvement – either across the spectrum, or focusing
more specifically on areas of under-performance;
● to help drive effective management, leadership and systems – either within
individual organisations or across organisational boundaries and in partnerships;
● to help drive efficient and effective use of resources (alongside and complementary
to the audit function);
● to help identify and disseminate best practice to support improvement more widely.
Inspection Reform: The Future of Local Services Inspection
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3.5 These aims do, to a degree, overlap. The aspirations of a new performance framework
and the wider strategy for inspection mean that we will need to be more rigorous and
selective about which aims we place at the heart of a new inspection framework. We
also need to acknowledge that some of those aims can be secured by means other than
inspection. 
3.6 Some of those other mechanisms for securing our aims that might be more efficient or
effective than inspection include:
● audit;
● peer and/or partner review;
● the scrutiny function of local authorities;
● customer/user mechanisms/whistle blowing;
● self assessment and requirements for councils to report on their performance.
3.7 We must, however, guard against simply shifting the cost and burden of inspection
elsewhere. The challenge is therefore to determine overall how appropriate external
challenge can be managed within the new performance framework, and more
specifically where inspection can bring the greatest benefits, at acceptable cost to both
the system overall and to frontline staff.
Users, customers & citizens
3.8 A key facet of the new performance framework – and the public service reform agenda
more generally – is the ambition for greater user and customer responsiveness in
services, and the opportunity for greater involvement and empowerment of users and
citizens in the system as a whole. Inspection will be an important tool in reflecting and
reinforcing these ambitions.
3.9 While the quality of services has improved since the introduction of Comprehensive
Performance Assessment (CPA), customer satisfaction with service provision is declining
and users’ expectations, both in terms of what is delivered and how it is delivered are
increasing. The new CPA framework for 2005 includes a much greater focus on users
and how their various needs are met by the local authority. In other inspection regimes,
eg. the new Children’s Services Joint Area Reviews, mechanisms are being developed to
include service users more directly in inspections. This progress is all positive, but is
only a starting point. The Government wants to see the user, customer and citizen
perspectives further enhanced in inspection in future. 
Inspection Reform: The Future of Local Services Inspection
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3.10 These ambitions could be secured in a number of ways – from fundamental definitions
of the duty and roles of the inspectorate, through to practical arrangements in
undertaking inspection. Possible options, that need further exploring and
consideration, could include:
● the local services inspectorate being given a specific remit or statutory duty to focus
on – or even champion – user, customer and citizen interests and needs in carrying
out any of its activities;
● a requirement that, in undertaking any inspection, the local services inspectorate
should develop means of capturing user, customer and citizen views, including those
at risk of adverse discriminatory impact, possibly through:
– full use of existing information from customer satisfaction surveys and other sources;
– requiring user-assessments to be included in self-assessments;
– directly seeking user, customer and citizen views through surveys, focus groups,
etc.;
– establishing sounding or reference boards of users, customers and citizens to
report to during and at the end of the inspection;
– including users and their advocates in inspection teams and enabling them to
help shape judgements.
● in making inspection judgements the local services inspectorate could be required to:
– have a focus on how user, customer and citizen needs and wants are met in an
area or in the delivery of particular services (including how different needs and
wants are balanced, how services engage with and meet the needs of different
groups, including the most excluded);
– find ways of testing the evidence of the authority or partnership eg. through
posing as a customer, direct contact with user groups and their advocates, etc.;
– provide external challenge on the way the local authority/partnership gathers and
uses information about users, customers and citizens (from customer satisfaction
surveys through the wider range of softer information) to influence its
commissioning and delivery of services.
Inspection Reform: The Future of Local Services Inspection
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● building on existing requirements to publish inspection reports, the local services
inspectorate could be expected to make the results of its work easily accessible to
users, customers and citizens, possibly through:
– publication and dissemination of the conclusions in user-friendly ways;
– feedback sessions to groups of users, customers and citizens.
3.11 Inspection is only one means of seeking to promote and develop user focus and
empowerment. Wider work is being developed on other aspects of this agenda,
including improving information about customer needs and perceptions, strengthening
mechanisms for user involvement in determining strategy and delivery of services, and
exploring ways for them to secure responses to under-performance.
WHAT TO INSPECT – ORGANISATIONS, AREAS, PARTNERSHIP WORKING
3.12 Local services can be considered in many different ways – each of which could
potentially provide a focus for inspection:
● individual services and their directly delivered outcomes (eg. housing management,
benefits payment, etc.);
● there is an allied question as to whether the view of inspection’s potential role
differs in cases where services are being commissioned from external providers;
● individual organisations – both in terms of corporate functions and securing
outcomes (eg. local authorities, registered social landlords, fire & rescue authorities,
etc.);
● joined-up outcomes as experienced by users, customers or citizens (eg. supporting
people services, community safety, liveability, etc.);
● partnership working or joint-working mechanisms, and the contributions of
individual organisations to such activity, to secure the delivery of joined-up or
common outcomes (eg. Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships, Youth Offending
Teams, etc.);
● client groups (eg. neighbourhoods, older people, Gypsies & Travellers, etc.).
Inspection Reform: The Future of Local Services Inspection
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WHEN AND WHERE TO INSPECT – RISK-ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAMMING
3.13 There are three main approaches to determining when and where to carry out
inspection, which we explore below:
● published programmes;
● unannounced, random sampling;
● triggered inspection.
3.14 The current approach to most inspection is to use published programmes – setting
out which organisations/areas are to be inspected in a particular period. In some cases,
these programmes are universal – eg. the Audit Commission’s programme of corporate
assessments for single tier and county councils covers every authority over a 3 year
cycle. However, aspects of risk-management and proportionality can be built into these
programmes through scoping the extent and depth of the inspection based on an
assessment of risks. The Audit Commission’s restriction of service inspection primarily
to those authorities with lower CPA categorisations reflects this. Such approaches could
be applied more widely. The length of the cycle of inspection could also be changed in
line with risk, eg. an inspectorate may return within 1 year to an authority which was a
poor performer, but might leave it 4 or 5 years before revisiting a high performer. 
3.15 It would also be possible, at least for some types of inspection, to develop programmes
as more of an incentive for improvement. This would build on the BFI’s current
approach, which involves using a risk approach to select the poorest performing
councils for inspection and setting its inspection work in phases that last for less than a
year. Local authorities are dropped from the programme if they demonstrate sufficient
improvement by a particular time. 
3.16 If inspection is required to provide a driver for delivery across a whole sector, with a
minimal amount of actual inspection activity, random sampled, unannounced
inspection could prove a powerful tool. It might operate on the basis of an announced
number of inspections being undertaken in a period (eg. a year), but the location of
those inspections would not be revealed – creating the potential of inspection across
the sector. Such approaches are not currently used, although the new schools model is
based on unannounced inspection as a means of ensuring a more realistic picture and
reducing the burden of preparation for inspection. 
3.17 The final model is that inspection should be triggered by under-performance. This
would focus inspection on the poorer end of the performance scale, providing a means
of driving improvement there and an incentive for higher performers not to slip.
Triggers for inspection might include:
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● hard data/evidence eg. performance falling below certain standards or evidence of
unusually high costs;
● concerns from delivery partners about contribution to joint-outcomes;
● users, customers or citizens – either through particular individual or collective
trigger mechanisms in response to dissatisfaction with service levels or on the basis
of customer satisfaction or related data;
● concerns about the risk to public funds;
● by Ministers eg. in response to a critical service failure. 
3.18 We are exploring the role of triggers and responses as we develop our wider work on
the whole performance framework. It is clear that where triggers are pursued,
inspection is one of the potential responses.
BRINGING THIS TOGETHER
3.19 We have set out a range of issues in connection with our starting questions about:
● why inspect?
● what to inspect?
● when and where to inspect?
3.20 We need to address these in the context of a desire to see a performance framework
that seeks to shift accountability for performance more clearly to users of services and
seeks to achieve a better balance between such bottom-up pressures from local users
and citizens, horizontal pressures from local partners and peers, as well as top-down
from Government.
3.21 In that context, we would particularly value responses to the following questions:
Question 1
(a) What should be the principal purposes of the future inspection regime for
local services?
(b) How can inspection best support sharper accountability to service users
and citizens? 
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lQuestion 3
(a) Should we move away from a general presumption about programmes of
inspection that cover all organisations over a period of time – except in a
few specified areas – and more towards inspection triggered by specific
evidence of risks and/or poor performance?
(b) What part can a programme of randomly sampled, unannounced inspection
play in driving up standards or performance across organisations?
Question 2
(a) What is the most appropriate balance to be struck in terms of future
inspection of:
• individual services?
• individual organisations?
• joined-up outcomes (across organisations)?
• partnerships?
(b) How should the future inspection regime reflect an increasing focus on
collaboration between local partners to secure outcomes via LAAs, etc.?
Inspection Reform: The Future of Local Services Inspection
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SECTION 2
Establishing The Local Services
Inspectorate
Chapter 4
Scope and Roles of the 
Local Services Inspectorate
In line with the Budget announcement, a local services inspectorate is to be
established by 2008. It will bring together the current remits of the Audit
Commission and the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (only in relation to its inspection
of English local authorities).
This chapter proposes the range of roles and functions for the local services
inspectorate. Each is considered in terms of what it will entail, its scope and any
limitations or boundaries. We will firm these proposals up in the light of
consultation responses, and use them to determine the powers and duties that the
local services inspectorate will need.
4.1 This chapter explores the following roles for the local services inspectorate6:
i) deliverer of inspection judgements;
ii) working in partnership with other inspectorates and regulators;
iii) gatekeeper (including information broker);
iv) audit – both financial and value for money;
v) national studies;
vi) supporting improvement.
Clearly, all of these roles will be performed within the context of the overall purpose,
volume and type of inspection that is the subject of the issues canvassed in Section 1 of
this document.
(I) DELIVERER OF INSPECTION JUDGEMENTS
4.2 The key attributes of an inspectorate (identified in para 3.3) comprise its ability to make
independent, robust and evidence-based judgements on performance and delivery. 
This is the core of inspection and it is a role that will be central to the local services
inspectorate. It encompasses:
22
6 Decisions have yet to be taken on how any planned new regulator/local enforcer relationships, eg. the Consumer and Trading
Standards Agency, would operate in the new landscape.
● devising & publishing methodologies and criteria for making judgements:
(a) about the delivery or securing of outcomes; and
(b) for risk-assessments where these are used to determine whether inspection is
undertaken, and what its scope and timing should be.
● drawing up programmes of inspection (for agreement through any relevant
gatekeeping mechanisms – see 4.9–4.16), monitoring risks and responding to any
other triggers for inspection;
● securing delivery of these programmes – either through their own resources or by
securing joint working with other inspectorates, experts, etc.;
● accountability for the judgements and recommendations arising from inspection.
4.3 The local services inspectorate’s evidence-based judgements may be stand alone
verdicts or contributory elements which feed into wider methodologies – either their
own or of other inspectorates.
4.4 The scope of its responsibilities in delivering judgements needs to be clearly set out. 
In seeking to define this scope we are not suggesting that there would be future
inspection activity in these areas – such decisions will need to be influenced by the
issues in Section 1 of this document.
4.5 To the extent that it is considered necessary that inspection activity is required in the
following areas, the local services inspectorate’s role in delivering inspection judgements
will cover:
● local authorities’ corporate capacity and performance;
● all services and functions commissioned or delivered by local authorities
except children’s services and adult social care – which are specifically covered
by the remits of one of the other inspectorates; 
● local authorities’ community leadership and partnership working – this is a
critical area where local authorities add value and is reflected in the development of
the new CPA 2005 methodology to cover local authorities’ contribution to the
delivery in their locality of the Shared Priorities, either directly themselves or through
their partnership working. Many of the outcomes being sought through the delivery
of local council services are dependent upon effective partnership working and the
ability of councils to deliver high quality community leadership based upon effective
partnerships. This will be an increasingly significant focus for the inspectorate;
● fire and rescue authorities;
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● police authorities – inspection will be undertaken jointly with the criminal justice
inspectorates (in future, the proposed Inspectorates for Justice, Community Safety
and Custody);
● all other Best Value authorities as set out in the Local Government Act 1999;
● housing associations and registered social landlords – the local services
inspectorate will undertake the inspection of such bodies, but will not duplicate the
Housing Corporation’s regulatory role; 
● area-based cross-cutting outcomes delivered through local partnerships –
given the increased emphasis on assessing cross-cutting outcomes for users and
residents in local authority areas, in the medium to longer term, the future focus of
inspection activity may be increasingly area-based. Given local authorities’ critical
role as community leaders and their partnership working to influence delivery in
their area (eg. through Local Strategic Partnerships, Crime & Disorder Reduction
Partnerships, etc.), the local services inspectorate must work with other
inspectorates to deliver judgements on cross-cutting outcomes.
(II) INSPECTORATES WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP – A DUTY TO CO-OPERATE
4.6 While the rationalisation from 11 public service inspectorates to 4 will in itself promote
co-operation between inspection regimes within each inspectorate, measures are also
needed to secure effective co-ordination and collaboration between the inspectorates.
Therefore each inspectorate will be charged with a specific duty to co-operate. 
4.7 This duty to collaborate and co-operate with the other inspectorates and regulators will
require the local services inspectorate to:
● share information and data with other bodies;
● consult, collaborate, co-operate and co-ordinate activity with them (including the
ability to delegate its functions to others, if appropriate, to enable this);
● actively consult on proposed programming priorities in own sector and co-operate
with other inspectorates, their sponsor departments and other regulatory or
improvement bodies, to assist the effective co-ordination of cross-sector engagement
and involvement in inspection and improvement activities;
● refrain from unnecessary inspection or activity. 
Question 4
We would welcome views on the defined scope of the local services
inspectorate’s responsibility for delivering inspection judgements.
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4.8 This duty will support:
● the gatekeeper role (described in more detail below);
● joint working between inspectorates to develop and deliver methodologies which
are not restricted by the boundaries of their individual remits, without creating
duplication. For example, the inspectorate for justice, community safety & custody
will have responsibility for inspection of the contribution that the police (and other
justice bodies as appropriate) make to wider community safety. However, the local
services inspectorate will have responsibility for inspection of local authorities’ (and
other local services’ as appropriate) contributions. But subject to that, they would
have shared responsibility for inspection of partnership delivery, exercised according
to agreed “gatekeeping” arrangements.
● sharing and adoption of best-practice across the inspection landscape, eg. on
methodological approaches like how to capture user and customer views, on
practical arrangements like training and development of inspectors; and
● minimising duplication of requests for information and data from inspected bodies,
including the co-ordination and rationalisation of self-assessment requirements.
(III) GATEKEEPER
4.9 While the focus of inspection can be very varied (see para 3.12), its burden falls upon
the institutions or bodies that are inspected. Voluntary arrangements between
inspectorates have for some time sought to co-ordinate inspection programmes to
manage their impact. However, while they have had some success, these have not
proved effective enough to remove the problem of unco-ordinated inspection
programmes creating a cumulatively excessive burden. As inspection shifts its focus
from individual institutions’ activities to those individual or shared activities (eg.
through partnerships) that have an impact on the public, there is likely to be more
cross-cutting inspection in the future. Delivering the rationalisation of inspection that
we seek therefore requires a means of controlling the total burden on institutions or
bodies, even if inspection methodologies are not in future primarily focused on them.
4.10 The common duty to co-operate on each inspectorate (see above) is a good starting
point. However, while it is a necessary element, it is insufficient to ensure our
rationalisation ambitions are delivered – particularly in the most complex circumstances
eg. local authorities which may be subject to inspection by each of the inspectorates. 
Question 5
We would welcome views on whether the local services inspectorate – in
common with the other inspectorates – should have a general duty in law to 
co-operate as described.
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4.11 The gatekeeper role is intended to overcome this. Each of the four new public service
inspectorates will have such a role in respect of the institutions or bodies for which they
have the best overview of inspection’s impact and burden. For this reason, the local
services inspectorate will be the gatekeeper for all inspection affecting:
● local authorities (eg. including children’s services and adult social care, but excluding
schools);
and insofar as is necessary:
● local partnerships;
● fire and rescue authorities;
● housing associations and registered social landlords (excluding any regulation
activity by the Housing Corporation).
4.12 An inspection will be considered to ‘affect’ any of these bodies, if it involves any
preparation by them before the inspection, any visits, contact or requests for
information as part of the inspection.
4.13 The main elements of the gatekeeper role are:
● co-ordination of forward programming in relation to institutions and
bodies affected – the gatekeeper’s agreement would be required for any
inspection activity that impacted on the sector for which it was gatekeeping; and
● information brokering – the gatekeeper would be responsible for ensuring that
available information on the institutions and bodies in its sector and their
performance or contribution was shared and used effectively, thus avoiding the need
for further requests for the same information and for inspection where adequate
information and judgements already exist.
4.14 We also recognise that there may be occasions when the inspecting inspectorate and
the gatekeeper cannot reach agreement. We do not expect these to occur often – not
least because of the duty to co-operate – and recognise that where they do, they may
be a reflection of conflicting policy ambitions. There will therefore be a fall-back – for
the proposing inspectorate to escalate the issue to Ministers, where final decision-
making power will lie.
4.15 Ministers will retain a power to direct an inspection in exceptional circumstances,
overriding the gatekeeping arrangements if necessary. However, they would generally at
least seek the gatekeeper’s views to ensure they had a full picture to inform their
decision.
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4.16 Insofar as any inspection activity that the local services inspectorate is responsible for
impacts on any institutions ‘gatekept’ by another inspectorate, the local services
inspectorate will need to secure the gatekeeper’s agreement to any proposed
programmes.
(IV) LOCAL PUBLIC AUDIT FUNCTION
4.17 The Audit Commission was originally established to secure audit for local public sector
bodies. As far as local government is concerned, its role was expanded into inspection
in the Local Government Act 1999. It also has audit powers in relation to the following
non-local government bodies7:
● joint authorities;
● health authorities (by invitation);
● port health authorities;
● the Broads Authority;
● national park authorities;
● police authorities;
● fire and rescue authorities;
● licensing planning committees;
● local probation boards;
● internal drainage boards;
and a variety of other small bodies and committees.
Question 6
Do you agree with our proposal for the gatekeeper role?
Do you agree that the local services inspectorate should be the gatekeeper for
local authorities, fire and rescue authorities, housing associations and registered
social landlords, and local partnerships where appropriate?
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Therefore, in establishing a local services inspectorate, we need to address whether we
wish to incorporate all of the Audit Commission’s current audit powers into the new
inspectorate:
4.18 There is an issue of the relationship between audit, inspection and helping
organisations secure overall value for money. Public sector audit plays a critical role in
public service regulation. This role can be split into two main aspects:
(i) financial audit – the opinion on annual accounts;
(ii) value for money audit – assessment of the overall corporate financial and
performance management of the organisation to secure economy, efficiency and
effectiveness, and including assessment of corporate arrangements for
management of value for money.
4.19 Auditors’ vfm work is directed to the overall performance management and financial
management arrangements that have been put in place by organisations and not at
individual services. There are 5 essential elements around which auditors reach a formal
conclusion in respect of the ‘use of resources’, of which 4 relate directly to financial
issues and systems of internal control:
● financial management, 
● financial standing, 
● financial reporting, 
● internal controls and 
● value for money. 
4.20 Information from financial audit work can provide valuable evidence and information
for inspectors. The wider vfm audit role can have even closer links with inspection,
particularly where it is exploring value for money issues – and sometimes the interface
between the two can become confused. This is in part because, prior to the growth of
inspection, auditors’ vfm and ‘performance audit’ work expanded. The Audit
Commission has sought to clarify the distinctions between vfm audit and inspection8.
The distinction between the two is that vfm audit is focused on corporate systems and
controls and draws on information gained as part of financial audit work, whereas
inspection will generally focus more specifically on the management of vfm in relation
to specific service or cross-cutting outcomes 
4.21 Clearly, this distinction cannot be drawn rigidly – and the key is therefore that
appropriate arrangements exist between auditors and inspectors to prevent duplication
and to draw on each others’ respective expertise. The development by the Audit
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Commission auditors of ‘use of resources’ judgements to fit into both the CPA of local
authorities and the Healthcare Commission’s judgements demonstrate how this can be
effectively achieved. Future arrangements must ensure that these kinds of positive
relationships between auditors and inspectors in all inspectorates can continue and be
further developed.
4.22 We believe there are strong arguments for maintaining audit responsibilities within a
single body, rather than trying to separate the existing arrangements between the other
new inspectorates. This would mean the local services inspectorate taking forward the
Audit Commission’s current powers (though not duties) to arrange the audit function
for the public bodies listed in 4.17 above. The benefits of this, we believe, are that: 
● it would retain the efficiency benefits of having a single body responsible for
securing independent audit of local public service deliverers – not least through the
market power in the purchasing in of audit capacity from the private sector;
● it is the simplest means of ensuring common application of audit standards across
local public services;
● keeping the financial and vfm audit functions together is essential to avoid
duplication of effort – vfm audit relies upon evidence and information gathered in
the work to provide an opinion on the annual accounts;
● it provides opportunities to develop further the tracking of public funds in an area,
to support the key aim of maximising transparency about the use of valuable public
resources in an increasing complex world of joined-up delivery and partnership
working.
4.23 We believe that the case for continuing this audit function as a role for the local services
inspectorate is strong. Such an approach enhances the simplification of the overall
regulatory landscape. It also maintains the valuable interface that has been developed
between audit and the Audit Commission’s current inspection work, particularly in
relation to local government but also to its wider audit role in relation to the non-local
government bodies.
Question 7
We would welcome your views on our proposal that the local services
inspectorate should have all the Audit Commission’s current powers to carry out
financial and vfm audit of all local government and non-local government bodies
as listed in paragraph 4.17 above.
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(V) NATIONAL STUDIES
4.24 The Audit Commission currently has broad powers9 to undertake studies to help
improve economy, efficiency and effectiveness in audited bodies ie. across local
government, housing, criminal justice and fire and rescue services, etc. Following the
Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003, its powers in
relation to health do not entitle the Audit Commission to comment on policy.
4.25 These studies play a useful role in drawing together findings discovered at the local
level and using those to draw conclusions which could have national importance. They
produce a range of evidence-based outputs, including tools for organisations and
auditors that tackle cross-cutting and value for money areas. The programme of studies
is targeted to tackle topical, cross-cutting and value for money issues.
4.26 However, the range of the Audit Commission’s current remit overlaps with other
inspectorates’ areas of responsibility. That has in the past created duplication which the
Audit Commission has sought to limit by reviewing its proposals for commissioning study
research for national reports and consulting widely on its proposed studies programme. 
4.27 National studies are valuable as indicated in para. 4.25 above. Some, however may
consider that they should be undertaken by relevant sector inspectorates. If we wanted
that to be the case, we might consider constraining the local services inspectorates’
powers to undertake studies outside local authorities, to ensure that duplication was
minimised. 
4.28 There are three options:
Option 1 – that the local services inspectorate should continue to undertake national
studies in line with their audit powers and following consultation, where those studies
will deliver an independent view, useful evidence and identify good practice.
Option 2 – to strengthen the consultation arrangements requiring the local services
inspectorate to seek the agreement, not just consult, the relevant inspectorate before
undertaking any national studies outside its own (local government) sector. This would
ensure that proposed studies were not duplicative or unnecessary and would allow
consideration of whether the study could be more effectively carried out through joint
working or by others in their respective sectors.
Option 3 – to constrain the local services inspectorate’s powers in relation to bodies
that are listed in para. 4.17 above, such as police, probation boards, etc. to looking only
at financial management. This is the current model for health which has been working
well and still allows the Commission to comment on financial issues for which it is,
rightly, considered to be an expert. It would then enable equivalent studies powers to
be adopted by the other inspectorates for their sectoral interests.
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(VI) THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL SERVICES INSPECTORATE IN SUPPORTING
IMPROVEMENT
4.29 Inspection contributes to the improvement of individual services and institutions by
making independent judgements about the standard of the relevant services and the
outcomes experienced by users, assessing these against best practice or targets,
reporting on them in public and making recommendations for improvement. 
4.30 Some inspectorates take this process a stage further and not only provide advice to
service providers on improving their services, but also offer fee-earning consultancy to
help implement improvements. For example, the Audit Commission provides advice on
best practice examples and on the quality of local authorities’ improvement plans as
part of their main work. In addition, they have a power10 to undertake more
‘consultancy style’ work for a fee, if specifically commissioned to do so by an authority.
This allows the Commission to stay in touch with leading edge practice. The
Commission were paid £2m through such fees this year to cover the costs of this work.
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate runs a Performance Development Team (PDT) for the
DWP. The PDT offers free advice and guidance to individual local authorities on how to
increase administrative efficiency and deliver sustainable improvements in benefit
service performance. The Commission for Social Care Inspection also has a clear
improvement role, working with local authorities on their improvement plans. Ofsted
does not engage in improvement work beyond the publication of inspection reports.
4.31 There are a range of other bodies also currently involved in challenging improvement,
including Government Departments and Government Offices or supporting it such as
sectoral support bodies like the LGA’s Performance Partnership bodies (4Ps, Employers’
Question 8
We would welcome your comments on whether the local services inspectorate:
(a) should retain the Audit Commission’s powers to undertake national studies
in the same way as at present; ie. to continue to undertake national
studies in local public services, where these will deliver useful outcomes?
(b) should only have powers to undertake national studies that impact on non-
local government sectors subject to the agreement to the inspectorate for
that sector;
or
(c) whether in respect of non-local government bodies the local service
inspectorate’s powers should exclude comment on Government policy, in
line with current powers in relation to health?
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Organisation, LACORS and the Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA)),
regional and sub-regional improvement partnerships that are starting to be established
and direct support relationships between individual authorities, such as the Kent-
Swindon social services franchise. So the question is whether such as role is also
necessary within an inspectorate for local services.
4.32 It is the case that, through their inspection work, inspectorates gain a valuable
understanding of what works and what doesn’t in driving improvement in services and
organisations. Also, over recent years, some local authorities have expressed a desire for
inspectorates to go beyond purely making recommendations. So there is clearly a
critical role for inspectorates to play as a generic commentator on good practice and
scope for improvement.
4.33 There are two main areas of concern in respect of the extent of the role inspectorates
play in supporting improvement:
(i) conflicts of interest with the inspectorate’s over-arching duty to make
judgements on performance. The independence of their judgement might be
compromised (or perceived to be so) if they are seen to have had a close role in
improvement work before inspections. Equally, councils may feel pressured into
seeking inspectorates’ advice as a means of ensuring future positive inspections.
This could be overcome by ensuring that inspection and improvement work are
kept separate within the inspectorate, so that those undertaking any inspection
have not previously been engaged in any related improvement work. Finally, where
improvement work is funded through the charging of fees, concerns can arise
about the motivation of the inspectorate in seeking such work and in possibly
being diverted from its core role.
(ii) value for money of improvement support activity. At present, Government funds
improvement and support activity (through a top-slice of revenue support grant
based on a recommendation by the Local Government Association), among the
Performance Partnership bodies. Funding additional bodies in this area can only be
justified if they clearly undertake a separate function and constitute better value for
money than consolidating these functions within existing infrastructure. 
4.34 In relation to individual institutions, there is a spectrum of ‘improvement’ work that an
inspectorate could, potentially, undertake:
lesser role greater role
Recommendations 
for improvement in 
inspection reports
Signposting best 
practice & reviewing 
the robustness of individual
improvement plans
On-going challenge 
on delivery against 
implementation plan
Active role in 
designing & 
implementing 
improvements
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4.35 The key question is therefore how far along this spectrum the local services
inspectorate should operate. We believe that a balance needs to be struck between the
issues explored above. The local services inspectorate should support improvement by:
● making clear recommendations in its inspection judgements about ways in which
services, organisations and outcomes can be improved; 
● ensuring that knowledge of what drives effective delivery and improvement acquired
in their inspection work is shared with deliverers and others involved in supporting
improvement;
● signposting best practice and improvement support to local authorities and partners
post-inspection;
● providing feedback and challenge on improvement plans developed on the back of
inspection reports;
● providing information to inform policy decisions that will impact on local authority
performance.
4.36 We propose that the inspectorate should have a clearer role in improvement work as
described above, and that it be funded as part of its inspection activity. This implies the
removal of the Audit Commission’s current power to undertake more consultancy-style
work on a fee basis, and that of the PDT service currently delivered by the BFI. Clearly,
it will be for DWP to determine whether it continues to provide this service.
Question 9
We would welcome your views on the proposed improvement role for the local
services inspectorate – and its limitations.
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Chapter 5
Governance and Funding
Options for New Local Services
Inspectorate
This chapter proposes that the local services inspectorate is created by amending
the existing Audit Commission, rather than abolishing it and creating a new body.
It also sets out a broad consideration of the different funding options for the local
services inspectorate – though final decisions on which to pursue will need to be
taken once there is clarity on its roles.
GOVERNANCE OF THE NEW INSPECTORATE
5.1 The 2005 Budget statement referred to “establishing a single inspectorate of local
services merging the Audit Commission’s and the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate’s
inspection functions in relation to English local authorities”.
5.2 There are fundamentally 2 options for delivering this:
(a) to create a completely new local services inspectorate, with all the functions and
roles set out from scratch; or
(b) to amend the existing Audit Commission’s powers, duties and structures to reflect
the changes in functions. 
5.3 We consider that there are practical and legislative reasons why a new body may not be
desirable. The Audit Commission is a strong brand and has a good reputation for
independence, impartiality and effectiveness. If we chose to replace it with a completely
new body we would lose that. There would also be considerable upheaval in such a
change which could jeopardise the Commission’s current work programme and
continuity between the old and the new. 
5.4 It does not seem sensible to abolish an existing body, simply to establish another with
very similar functions, duties and powers. The expansion of the remit, from
incorporating the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate’s local authority inspection functions, can
be secured through minimal amendments to the Audit Commission’s remit and powers.
Further consideration of what amendments might be required will be undertaken, with
the Department for Work and Pensions, over the coming months.
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5.5 Moreover, given that inspection is a knowledge-based business, retaining inspection
expertise throughout this period of change is an important consideration. 
5.6 Finally, there are cost considerations. The abolition of one body and the creation of a
new one will incur significant costs. Amending the remit of an existing body reduces
many of these costs very significantly.
5.7 Theoretically, we could retain the Audit Commission, but signal its changing role
through a change of name or branding. However, this would reduce some of the
benefits of retaining the Audit Commission identified above.
5.8 So, we propose retaining the Audit Commission, but amending its functions and powers
as necessary. 
5.9 Similarly, we also do not see any strong case for changing the basic governance model –
an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body – which provides a strong assurance of
independence. The Secretary of State would continue to appoint a Chair and Board,
and the body would be subject to Cabinet Office Guidance ‘Non Departmental Public
Bodies: A Guide for Departments’. However, minor changes – for example to the
minimum number of Board members required – will be considered.
FUNDING OPTIONS
5.10 Decisions about funding of future inspectorate activity will need to reflect decisions on
the roles – including the conclusions reached on the future role of inspection.
However, we would welcome initial views on the broad options for future funding of
the local services inspectorate.
5.11 The Audit Commission currently charges fees for all its audit work, and its inspection
work is funded through a mix of fees and Government grant. The BFI is part of the
DWP, but operates independently of those administering benefits, reporting directly to
the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. The Inspectorate does not charge a fee to
councils, and is funded in the form of a delegated budget from DWP.
5.12 Other public services Inspectorates are either grant funded by their parent Department
or, in the case of Non-Ministerial Departments, funded direct by HM Treasury. This
means that the inspected bodies do not directly fund any of the cost of their inspection.
5.13 In the case of the local services inspectorate, it will secure audit and inspect public
bodies, so the funding arrangements need to represent the most sensible way of
distributing public expenditure between central Departments, the inspectorate and the
bodies themselves. We believe that there are three funding options for the local services
inspectorate in the future:
Inspection Reform: The Future of Local Services Inspection
35
● Option 1 – Keep the current funding arrangements
Audit work would continue to be fee funded. The new inspectorate would retain
powers to charge fees for inspection underpinned by a grant payment from ODPM, to
allow inspection fees to local authorities to be discounted. As a more proportionate
inspection regime was introduced, top performing councils would receive little or no
inspection, and inspection fees would therefore fall mostly on the poorest performing
councils. The current Revenue Support Grant formula does not match this distribution
and consideration would need to be given on how to ensure this issue was resolved. 
● Option 2 – All inspection and audit work is fee funded
Inspected bodies would cover the whole of inspection costs through fees. With
inspection increasingly shifting away from a pure focus on organisations and more
towards joined-up outcomes and partnership-working, this would create complexity
around decisions on who was to pay. It also replicates the problems raised under
Option 1 in relation to the poorest performers facing the greatest burden.
● Option 3 – All inspection is grant funded, audit work remains fee funded.
This would overcome the imbalance problems of the other two options. However, it
would lose the financial incentive for local authorities to perform well to avoid
inspection activity. Before any decisions could be made to go down this route, there
would need to be careful consideration of the impact on Revenue Support Grant and
of potential impact on ODPM’s expenditure.
Question 10
We would welcome initial views, based on your opinions on the future role of
inspection, about future funding arrangements.
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Chapter 6
Bringing Together the 
Audit Commission & Benefit
Fraud Inspectorate (BFI)
6.1 The merger of the Audit Commission and the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate, to create the
local services inspectorate, provides an opportunity to ensure that there is greater
consistency in the approach to inspection and to remove any duplication of effort. 
It will also provide an opportunity for the cross-fertilisation of ideas on how best to
undertake inspection work in the future, including minimising the inspection burdens
on authorities and ensuring that the local services inspectorate offers maximum value
for money. 
6.2 In doing so, consideration will be given to whether methodologies, arrangements for
selecting authorities and services for inspection and reporting arrangements can be
brought together to deliver a more streamlined approach. While the focus of inspection
in terms of providing assurance may be rebalanced to focus more on assurance in
respect of delivery of local priorities in future, a degree of assurance and lines of
accountability to Parliament through Ministers will need to be retained for benefits
services.
6.3 In line with recent calls for efficiency savings, consideration will need to be given to the
resourcing of the new local services inspectorate as a result of bringing together the
Audit Commission and Benefit Fraud Inspectorate. The successful implementation of
these decisions would require sensitive and appropriate handling of internal staff issues,
especially in relation to relocation and changes in the allocation of resources. ODPM will
work with the Audit Commission and DWP (including the BFI) to resolve any financial or
legislative implications, with staff and their representatives consulted as necessary. 
TERRITORIAL EXTENT
6.4 The local services inspectorate will inspect local authorities and their partners in England.
The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate currently inspects local authorities in England, Scotland
and Wales. It also carries out some inspections of DWP’s centrally administered benefits.
6.5 The intention to merge the Audit Commission with the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate will
have an impact on Housing Benefit inspection in Scotland and Wales. DWP will
undertake separate consultation with appropriate bodies in Scotland and Wales on this
matter, including Audit Scotland and the Wales Audit Office. 
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6.6 As it will not be appropriate for the local services inspectorate to inspect centrally
administered benefits, DWP will consider how this aspect of the Benefit Fraud
Inspectorate’s work will be covered in future.
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Chapter 7
Timetable for Implementation
7.1 This consultation will run until 3 March 2006. During that time, we will be seeking to
discuss the issues raised in it – both on the future role of inspection and the creation of
the local services inspectorate – with a wide range of stakeholders. We would also
welcome written responses. These should be sent to:
Dorothy Dray
LGQ4
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Zone 5/C5
Eland House 
Bressenden Place
London SW1E 5DU
Fax: 020 7944 3799
E-mail: LocalServicesInspection@odpm.gsi.gov.uk 
7.2 We will consider the issues raised in the consultation alongside the further development
of other aspects of the new performance framework and hope to be able to publish a
policy statement in mid-2006.
3 March 2006 Consultation closes
Mid 2006 Final policy statement 
November 2006-July 2007 2nd session legislation 
(subject to Queen’s Speech) 
July 2007 Royal Assent
Autumn 2007 Shadow running of new inspectorate
1 April 2008 Local services inspectorate in place
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ANNEX A
Principles of Inspection
The principles of inspection in this policy statement place the following
expectations on inspection providers and on the departments sponsoring them:
a) The purpose of improvement. There should be an explicit concern on the part of
inspectors to contribute to the improvement of the service being inspected. This
should guide the focus, method, reporting and follow-up of inspection. In framing
recommendations, an inspector should recognise good performance and address any
failure appropriately.
b) A focus on outcomes, not on process, which means considering outcomes for the
end users of the services rather than concentrating solely on internal management
arrangements.
c) A user perspective. Inspection should be delivered with a clear focus on the
experience of those for whom the service is provided, as well as on internal
management arrangements. Inspection should encourage innovation and diversity and
not be solely compliance-based.
d) Proportionate to risk. Over time, inspectors should modify the extent of future
inspection according to the quality of performance by the service provider. For example,
good performers should be allowed to earn less inspection, or other freedoms.
e) Inspectors should encourage rigorous self-assessment by managers. Inspectors should
challenge the outcomes of managers’ self-assessments, take them into account in the
inspection process, and provide a comparative benchmark.
f) Inspectors should use impartial evidence. Evidence, whether quantitative or
qualitative, should be validated and credible.
g) Inspectors should disclose the criteria they use to form judgements.
h) Inspectors should have regard to value for money, their own included:
– Inspection looks to see there are arrangements in place to deliver the service
efficiently and effectively
– Inspection itself should be able to demonstrate it delivers benefits commensurate
with its cost
i) Inspectors should continually learn from experience, in order to become increasingly
effective. This can be done by assessing their own impact on the service provider’s
ability to improve and by sharing best practice with other inspectors.
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ANNEX B
Consultation Arrangements
1. Copies of the covering note and consultation paper have been sent to all local
authorities in England and to other parties that have expressed an interest in issues
related to local services inspection.
2. The proposals in the enclosed paper concern arrangements for the inspection of
services commissioned or provided by local authorities.
3. The Office may wish to publish responses to this consultation exercise in due
course or deposit them in its libraries. If so, all responses received will be published
or deposited, unless a respondent specifically asks the Office to treat their response
as confidential. Confidential responses will, nevertheless be included in any
statistical summary of the numbers of comments received and views expressed.
4. A summary of responses will be published by 1 June and a copy will be available on
the web site of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister at the following address:
http://www.local.odpm.gov.uk 
A paper copy of the summary of responses can be obtained from
Dorothy Dray
LGQ4
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Zone 5/C5
Eland House 
Bressenden Place
London SW1E 5DU
Fax: 020 7944 3799
E-mail: LocalServicesInspection@odpm.gsi.gov.uk 
COMMENTS AND COMPLAINTS
This consultation is being undertaken in accordance with the Code of Practice on
Written Consultation; the main consultation criteria are:
THE CONSULTATION CRITERIA
The Government has adopted a code of practice on consultations. The criteria below
apply to all UK national public consultations on the basis of a document in electronic or
printed form. They will often be relevant to other sorts of consultation.
Though they have no legal force, and cannot prevail over statutory or other mandatory
external requirements (eg. under European Community Law), they should otherwise
generally be regarded as binding on UK departments and their agencies, unless
Ministers conclude that exceptional circumstances require a departure.
1. Consult widely throughout the process, allowing a minimum of 12 weeks
for written consultation at least once during the development of the
policy.
2. Be clear about what your proposals are, who may be affected, what
questions are being asked and the timescale for responses.
3. Ensure that your consultation is clear, concise and widely accessible.
4. Give feedback regarding the responses received and how the consultation
process influenced the policy.
5. Monitor your department’s effectiveness at consultation, including
through the use of a designated consultation co-ordinator.
6. Ensure your consultation follows better regulation best practice, including
carrying out a Regulatory Impact Assessment if appropriate.
The full consultation code may be viewed at 
www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/regulation/Consultation/Introduction.htm 
Are you satisfied that this consultation has followed these criteria? If not, or you have
any other observations about ways of improving the consultation process please
contact: 
Adam Bond, ODPM Consultation Co-ordinator, Room 2.19, 26 Whitehall, 
London, SW1A 2WH; or by e-mail to: adam.bond@odpm.gsi.gov.uk
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